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COMMENTARY 
A DEER IN HEADLIGHTS: 
THE SUPREME COURT, LGBT RIGHTS, AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Nan D. Hunter 
ABSTRACT 
In this Essay, I argue that the problems with how courts apply 
Equal Protection principles to classifications not already recognized 
as suspect reach beyond the most immediate example of sexual 
orientation. Three structural weaknesses drive the juridical 
reluctance to bring coherence to this body of law: two doctrinal and 
one theoretical. The first doctrinal problem is that the socio-political 
assumptions that the 1938 Supreme Court relied on in United 
States v. Carolene Products, Inc. to justify strict scrutiny for 
“discrete and insular minorities” have lost their validity. In part 
because of Roe v. Wade-induced PTSD, the courts have not 
generated a replacement paradigm for a society that is radically 
more diverse than the United States was at that time. The second 
doctrinal problem is that the discourse of Equal Protection law has 
become unnecessarily moralized, tending to infuse analysis of 
classifications with the question of whether a particular group of 
persons deserves judicial protection against majoritarian 
legislation. Finally, a theoretical issue has long plagued Equal 
Protection law: the role of ideology. Ostensibly irrelevant, it has 
nonetheless crept into the case law through references to, for 
example, “white supremacy,” but has never been fully and properly 
analyzed. 
The role of ideology and its relationship to the original meaning 
argument advanced by Professor Eskridge generates my primary 
critique of his claim. While the dynamics of gender and sexuality 
                                                     
  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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can be separated in many instances, I argue that they are 
inextricably intertwined in the ideological foundations for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation (though not always in 
the manifestations of such discrimination). Recognizing this melded 
conceptualization would enrich equality principles more than 
reading a sexual orientation distinction alone into the scope of the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the 
Supreme Court’s antipathy to acknowledging the ideological 
dimensions of inequality, however, it should consider explicit 
adoption of the proportionality test that it has in fact been utilizing 
in sexual orientation cases. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The social movement for LGBT equality has led to a 
remarkable result. Public opinion on the topic once thought to be 
the most controversial—the right of same-sex couples to marry—
has shifted dramatically to a position supportive of that claim.1 
At the same time, when faced with LGBT equality arguments, 
the Supreme Court appears to have abandoned any attempt to 
develop or even explicate the law of Equal Protection. In three 
decisions since 1996, the Court has acted to protect LGBT 
                                                     
 1. Jane Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About Popular 
Constitutionalism (and Vice-Versa), 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1154 (2015).  
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persons from discrimination without venturing beyond broad 
rhetorical gestures toward concepts of equality and liberty.2 
Since modern Equal Protection doctrine began with the 
articulation of strict scrutiny for race-based classification,3 the 
Court has addressed the standard of review applicable to a 
classification multiple times during roughly a twenty-five-year 
period: for sex,4 parental marital status,5 noncitizenship,6 
economic status,7 and disability.8 After an internal debate 
among the Justices in 1985 over whether to extend heightened 
scrutiny to “new” categories,9 the Court essentially concluded 
that further identification of suspect classifications was 
jurisprudentially unwise.10 Although the Court strengthened 
the intermediate standard for sex discrimination in United 
States v. Virginia,11 it has recognized no additional bases for 
heightened scrutiny for forty years. For sexual orientation 
cases, the Court has paired a refusal to invoke heightened 
scrutiny with an incongruous willingness to invalidate federal 
and state statutes and state constitutional amendments that 
disadvantage LGBT persons. It has not, however, produced the 
articulation of any standard of review applicable to sexual 
orientation-based classification. 
At least in part, the Court’s hesitancy to extend the logic 
of prior decisions that were premised on the criteria for 
heightened scrutiny developed as a reaction to a reaction, that 
is, to the political movement mobilized in reaction to Roe v. 
Wade.12 Although not an Equal Protection decision, the social 
meaning of Roe is properly understood as an equality decision 
for women and the product of a social movement for women’s 
                                                     
 2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996). 
 3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 4. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 5. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1989). 
 6. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); see also Bernal v. Fainter, 467 
U.S. 216, 219–20 (1984). 
 7. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1970). 
 8. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). 
 9. Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L.J. 885, 898 
(2001). 
 10. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
 11. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
194 (1986) (“The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
design of the Constitution.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); cf. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–22 (1997). 
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rights.13 The backlash against Roe has frozen not only 
substantive due process law, the basis of the holding in Roe, 
but also may have contributed to the refusal to extend a higher 
level of review in Equal Protection law involving similarly 
contested “social issues.” 
By now, the Court’s silence on Equal Protection standards of 
review has produced its own discourse. The Court’s willingness to 
act repeatedly, but without explanation, has perplexed scholars 
and left lower courts scrambling for interpretive guidance. In this 
Article, I enter the fray by taking the argument out of the LGBT 
rights field alone and analyzing a variety of ways that the Court 
could tackle a much-needed modernization of the principles 
underlying heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection law. 
Specifically, I argue that the current disarray has two distinct 
components: doctrinal and theoretical. In Parts III and V, 
respectively, I propose ways for the Court to address each. 
In Part IV, I focus on the newest contribution to Equal 
Protection arguments about LGBT rights: Professor Eskridge’s 
assertion in the Frankel Lecture Address that, properly 
understood, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
per se mandates invalidation of laws that discriminate based on 
sexual orientation.14 The Frankel Lecture Address asks, in effect, 
whether original meaning theory can put the Humpty Dumpty of 
current Equal Protection law together again. Professor 
Eskridge’s original meaning argument rests on two pillars: a 
historical analysis of the conceptual and linguistic components of 
the phrase “equal protection of the law” and the incorporation of 
the anti-caste principle as the primary signifier of legitimacy for 
stringent judicial review.15 The latter is, to me, the more 
interesting aspect of the claim, primarily because of its 
implications for the scope of the shelter provided by, and the role 
of ideology in, Equal Protection law. These are the dimensions of 
original meaning jurisprudence to which I will turn in Parts IV 
and V. 
Initially, however, one must situate this analysis in the 
context of Equal Protection law more broadly. In Part II, I 
address the first of the two components underlying the Court’s 
silence: the doctrinal gap. The Court has never broken from its 
Footnote 4 foundations for heightened judicial review, even 
                                                     
 13. Nan D. Hunter, Reflections on Sexual Liberty and Equality: “Through Seneca 
Falls and Selma and Stonewall,” 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 172, 179 (2013). 
 14. William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1067 (2015). 
 15. Id. at 1073.  
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though they have been weakened by social and political change. 
The process-based protections for minority rights in a democracy 
may have functioned well in a demographically simple society, 
but the United States has grown far more complex. In addition, 
the rise of equality claims based on gender and sexuality-linked 
classifications has complicated the prejudice component of 
Footnote 4. The notion of prejudice has morphed into the concept 
of animus, which has tended to moralize judicial assessment of 
legislative classifications more than is necessary. 
In Part III, I analyze what I believe are the strongest 
frameworks for future Equal Protection issues that do not involve 
the traditionally protected categories. First, I argue that the 
Court could choose to come out of its Equal Protection closet by 
explicitly adopting the metrics of proportionality, a philosophy 
that the Court has not owned but the one that most closely fits 
what it has actually done in sexual orientation and other cases. 
Second, I consider the anti-caste principle—the first of the two 
pillars of the original meaning argument. I argue that the 
anti-caste principle—standing on its own and distinct from 
original meaning—provides a strong alternative mode of 
analysis. 
In Part IV, I turn to the original meaning argument in the 
Frankel Lecture. As a tactic for influencing jurists and others 
who have professed allegiance to original meaning philosophy 
but who are skeptical about a constitutional right of same-sex 
couples to marriage, the argument is appealing. I am doubtful, 
however, that it will suffice to unlock most such individuals from 
more traditionalist understandings of LGBT-related questions. 
My primary critique, however, is not tactical but conceptual. 
Even if an original meaning standard succeeds in a sexual 
orientation case, it may set the bar for meaningful Equal 
Protection review too high for other important claims because of 
the demanding criteria that are necessary to demonstrate the 
existence of a caste-like social structure. 
Finally, in Part V, I address one aspect of the theoretical 
vacuum in Equal Protection law: the role of ideology. Although 
an assessment of all the major theoretical shortcomings of Equal 
Protection jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
incorporation of ideology has long been a missing piece. 
Identifying a hegemonic ideology behind structures of dominance 
is a required element for a caste-based analysis to succeed. An 
anti-caste or original meaning argument grounded solely on the 
history of discrimination based on sexual orientation, as 
Professor Eskridge proposes, misses the inextricable factor of 
gender. It is precisely in the realm of ideology that gender 
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functions most powerfully in constitutional analysis of anti-gay 
subordination. 
This Article goes to press shortly before the Court’s next 
high impact LGBT rights decisions: the marriage equality issues 
raised in Obergefell v. Hodges and related cases.16 Whatever the 
outcome of that litigation, the decision on whether states must 
license or recognize same-sex marriages is unlikely to answer the 
deeper questions of Equal Protection jurisprudence. These 
questions will remain important for years to come. 
II. THE DOCTRINAL GAP: FALLING TIERS 
The Supreme Court appears to have abandoned the project 
of identifying explicit standards of review in LGBT-related cases. 
In its three major decisions in this field, the majority of the Court 
has carefully avoided discussion of the traditional tiers of Equal 
Protection review. The gap created by this silence has flummoxed 
advocates and lower federal court judges, who lack the freedom 
to jettison doctrine, and thus have clung to the familiar structure 
of three-tiered analysis both before and after the Court’s most 
recent decision regarding sexual orientation and Equal 
Protection in United States v. Windsor. As the Second Circuit 
dryly noted in 2012, “[I]t is safe to say that there is some 
doctrinal instability in this area.”17 
Leading up to the Windsor decision, the briefs of the parties 
and their supporting amici divided with parade ground precision 
along the line of which standard of review should govern, as is 
typical in conventional Equal Protection analysis.18 At issue was 
the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, which 
prohibited the federal government from recognizing any 
marriage between same-sex spouses, regardless of the lawfulness 
of the marriage under state law.19 Both sides framed the case in 
such a way that the standard of review was 
outcome-determinative.20 In his opinion for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy chose to ignore the issue, prompting protests by 
                                                     
 16. Petition for writ of certiorari granted Jan. 16, 2015. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 1039 (2015). 
 17. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 18. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 19. Id. at 2683 (majority opinion); Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)). 
 20. See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 28–30, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 
12-307), 2013 WL 267026; Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18–21, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048. 
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dissenting Justices that the absence of an articulated standard 
rendered the Court’s logic incomprehensible.21 
In the Courts of Appeals decisions since Windsor, judges 
have followed a variety of doctrinal paths, splitting on the level of 
review to be applied and on whether a liberty or an equality 
analysis should predominate. The Seventh Circuit held that the 
exclusion of gay couples from marriage violated the Equal 
Protection Clause under rational basis review.22 The Ninth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion relying on a prior Circuit 
decision finding that sexual orientation classifications must be 
subject to heightened scrutiny.23 The Fourth and Tenth Circuits 
utilized the equal liberty approach, suggesting that the 
fundamental right to marry formed the primary predicate for 
their decisions to strike down exclusionary laws, but ultimately 
grounding their conclusions on an interwoven and mutually 
reinforcing understanding of both liberty and equality.24 
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, rejected each of the possible 
bases for a finding of unconstitutionality and upheld bans on 
same-sex marriage in four states.25 In analyzing the correct 
standard for Equal Protection review, the court invoked the most 
deferential form of rational basis: “Our task . . . is to decide 
whether the law has some conceivable basis, not to gauge how 
that rationale stacks up against the arguments on the other 
side,” and cited Windsor as authority for recognizing the 
traditional role of states in defining marriage.26 Rather than a 
motivation based on animus, the court identified “fear that the 
courts would seize control over an issue that people of good faith 
care deeply about” as the driving force behind bans on same-sex 
marriage.27 
It is no wonder that there is a cacophony in the lower federal 
courts, when the Supreme Court itself appears to have reached a 
doctrinal dead end. In this situation, it is understandable that 
lower courts and advocates would continue to structure their 
Equal Protection reasoning around the standard of review. That 
focus, however, misses two structural factors that converge in the 
                                                     
 21. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2716 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the decision “seems to rest on [Equal Protection]”). 
 22. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 23. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 24. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 
755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 25. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 26. Id. at 408 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689). 
 27. Id. 
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Supreme Court’s silence: the broken foundation for stringent 
judicial review of legislative classifications and the moralized 
social meaning of strict scrutiny. 
A. The Obsolescence of Footnote 4 
The status quo of Equal Protection analysis, under which the 
tiers of review developed, emerged from the Court’s famous 
Footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products,28 later 
elaborated by John Hart Ely’s concept of representation 
reinforcement.29 Although that argument initially garnered wide 
support among scholars and judges, it no longer holds the same 
position of preeminence. The persuasiveness of the 
representation reinforcement principle has weakened steadily 
since Bruce Ackerman’s deconstruction of the concept of “discrete 
and insular minority,” arguing that it is the wrong beginning 
point for application of heightened scrutiny.30 
For Ackerman, the Footnote 4 representation reinforcement 
argument failed the test of late twentieth century politics 
because it gave too little weight to the potential impact of social 
movement mobilization that could be deployed by distinctive 
minorities31 and because it overlooked members of anonymous or 
diffuse groups32 “who, in the future, will have the greatest cause 
to complain that pluralist bargaining exposes them to 
systematic—and undemocratic—disadvantage.”33 The deepest 
harm from discrimination, he argued, was its impact on pariah 
groups, those whose interests failed to garner even respectful 
engagement and consideration in the legislative process.34 
Ackerman used gay people to illustrate his argument that “[l]ong 
after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong 
representation at the pluralist bargaining table, there will 
remain many other groups who fail to achieve influence remotely 
proportionate to their numbers.”35 
                                                     
 28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition 
[justifying judicial intervention], which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”). 
 29. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–
88 (1980). 
 30. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 734 
(1985). 
 31. Id. at 723–28. 
 32. Id. at 729–33. 
 33. Id. at 737. 
 34. Id. at 732, 38. 
 35. Id. at 742. 
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The paradox of political power in the United States—that 
minoritarian civil rights protections are achieved only when there is 
majoritarian support—has grown more complex since Ackerman 
wrote his article. The United States no longer contains only the 
relatively simple categories of race, national origin, and religion that 
constituted minority groups as the 1938 Court understood them in 
Footnote 4. Today a messy mix of hundreds of social groups occupies 
the demographic landscape.36 Patterns of assimilation and 
intermarriage blur the borders of each group, further complicating the 
premises underlying the representation reinforcement principle.37 
The same-sex marriage debate, with the adoption of equal 
marriage rights by democratic legislative or electoral majorities in 
twelve states plus the District of Columbia,38 illustrates how far the 
social reality has come since Ackerman used the example of gay men 
and lesbians to demonstrate the pariah principle. To put it 
colloquially, this is not your grandfather’s discrete and insular 
minority. 
The complexity of contemporary U.S. society has made the 
old criterion of zero-sum political powerlessness largely 
irrelevant. The white majority has decreased from 90% of the 
population in 1940 to 75% in 2010.39 The Census Bureau 
predicts that whites will become a population minority by 
2043.40 The largest single ethnic minority today is Hispanics, a 
group that was not even counted in 1940.41 For the late 1930s, 
                                                     
 36. See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 37. Marriage across racial and ethnic lines is increasing in the United States. 
In 1960, less than 1% of married couples were interracial. Table 1. Race of Wife by 
Race of Husband: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and 1992, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 10, 
1998), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractab1.txt. In 1980, 6.7% 
of new marriages involved spouses of different races or ethnicities; in 2010, the rate 
had more than doubled to 15.1%. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE 
OF INTERMARRIAGE: RATES, CHARACTERISTICS VARY BY RACE AND GENDER 5 (2012). A 
telephone survey in 2009 found that 35% of adults say that they have a close relative 
who is married to someone of a different race. Id. at 37 & n.17. 
 38. Equal marriage laws have resulted from majoritarian law making in 
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org 
/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 9, 2015).  
 39. Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1948, at 19 (1948), with KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A. 
JONES & ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN: 2010, at 7 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010 
/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. 
 40. U.S. Census Bureau Projections Show a Slower Growing, Older, More 
Diverse Nation a Half Century from Now, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-243.html. 
 41. Compare HUMES, JONES & RAMIREZ, supra note 39, at 6 tbl.2, 7 tbl.3, with 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 19. 
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the Statistical Abstract did not report numbers for any 
religions other than Christian or Jewish faiths.42 Today, the 
Pew Research Center includes Hindus, Native American 
religions, New Age faiths, and three subcategories each of 
Buddhists and Muslims in its reports on religion in the United 
States.43 
As LGBT political progress has demonstrated, even a 
minority that is quite small can achieve meaningful political 
power. Urban areas have long been a stronghold for LGBT 
political power, and effective coalition building within, and 
allegiance to, a political party can extend that power beyond the 
urban context.44 Yet despite strong LGBT representation at the 
pluralist bargaining table, there also remain enormous 
geographic disparities.45 If the Court wishes to articulate a 
coherent doctrinal approach in sexual orientation discrimination 
cases, it must acknowledge the possibility of profound 
unevenness in political representation and jettison a zero-sum 
metric of powerlessness. 
Although too long overlooked, the Carolene Products decision 
itself supports such flexibility. It envisions enhanced scrutiny of 
classifications penalizing characteristics that were disfavored in 
a particular time and place, in addition to characteristics such as 
race that have been enduring subjects of disfavor. The cases cited 
in Footnote 4 allude to discrimination against persons who were 
geographic outsiders in a particular state, even though not 
members of an otherwise stigmatized group,46 and Americans of 
German descent during a particular time period.47 Although 
                                                     
 42. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 389–92 (1975). 
 43. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study 
-full.pdf. 
 44. Marieka Klawitter & Brian Hammer, Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Local 
Antidiscrimination Policies for Sexual Orientation, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 22, 33 (Ellen D. B. Riggle & Barry L. Tadlock eds., 1999). 
 45. Schacter, supra note 1, at 1170–71.  
 46. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). In 
Barnwell, the Court found that even in an ordinary commercial regulation, an invidious 
distinction disadvantaging geographic and political outsiders could be invalid. As the 
Court explained, in conjunction with citing other cases as support, “[W]hen the regulation 
is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, 
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are 
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the 
state.” Id. at 185 n.2. 
 47. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 529–30 (1925); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 
409–10 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923). The statutes at issue in all 
three of these cases barred the teaching of German in public schools and were enacted in the 
wake of World War I. Cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927). 
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“differences in race and color” have historically served as 
markers of discrimination, the Court also has a record of 
understanding that “community prejudices are not static, and 
from time to time other differences from the community norm 
may define other groups which need the same protection.”48 It is 
this more contingent understanding of political power that the 
Court will need to reconsider in the future. 
B. The Moralization of Strict Scrutiny 
The Court’s reluctance to be more clear about its Equal 
Protection standards does not signal an unwillingness to develop 
new doctrine (there are plenty of examples of new doctrine in 
other fields), but rather an inability to escape being caught in the 
gears of normative change in the broader society. The majority of 
Justices have sought to eliminate egregious forms of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, without endorsing 
the proposition that sexual orientation is a neutral characteristic 
and that agents of the state may not assign moral weight to an 
individual’s sexual orientation. Fear of a backlash against such a 
position by social conservatives, and memory of the backlash 
against Roe v. Wade, has produced a jurisprudence of minimalist 
incrementalism. 
This fear, and the resulting intentional obfuscation of the 
interpretive principles normally embedded in precedent, is 
exacerbated by the right and wrong morality associated with the 
anti-discrimination command. Too often, the mandate of equal 
protection of the law bleeds into a moral assessment of the 
affected group, rather than the propriety of a classification. The 
shorthand question for strict scrutiny can too easily become 
whether the group deserves protection rather than whether the 
classification can be justified. 
In Equal Protection law, this moralization has come to a 
head in the Court’s use of animus as a marker of illicit 
legislative motive. The Court relied heavily on an inference of 
animus to invalidate a state constitutional amendment in 
Romer v. Evans,49 and Justice O’Connor made the articulation 
of an animus-based standard the grounding for her concurring 
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.50 In Windsor, the Court once 
again alluded to prejudice as a central rationale for striking 
down DOMA.51 
                                                     
 48. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). 
 49. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996). 
 50. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
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Using morality-inflected language to promote equality norms 
may seem appealing, but that discourse has not served women 
and sexual minorities well.52 Discomfort with venturing into the 
terrain of moral questions related to sexuality may partially 
explain why the Court has not more clearly formulated its 
doctrinal approach to LGBT cases. This category of cases will not 
disappear with the Court’s resolution of nationwide marriage 
rights, however. A more secular and sedate invocation of civic 
norms may seem less inspirational, but could be more productive 
in the long run in changing social practices. 
C.  Summary 
These two structural cracks in the underpinnings of the 
Footnote 4 paradigm create the demand and opportunity for the 
Court to explore new approaches to Equal Protection law. Sexual 
orientation cases provide an excellent context for that 
re-examination. This category of cases has signaled that the old 
engines for heightened judicial review—whether the presence of 
a discrete and insular minority or the absence of political 
power—are obsolete in today’s complex political and social 
culture. Moreover, a rhetoric or structure of reasoning that loads 
too much moral weight onto the concept of animus might 
contribute to, rather than discourage, an incitement of backlash 
against current and future generations of civil rights law. If the 
Court wishes to salvage the basic insight of Footnote 4—that 
legislative classifications must meet certain criteria for 
prejudice-driven failures of the democratic process before judicial 
invalidation can be justified—it must adapt representation 
reinforcement principles to contemporary society. 
 III. DIVERGING PATHS 
In the pending marriage cases, probably the smartest bet 
would be that the Court will continue its minimalist 
jurisprudence regardless of the possibility that the decision could 
change marriage laws across the country. Especially if Justice 
Kennedy writes the opinion of the Court and follows his own 
precedents, the Court may simply pave over the conceptual 
problems in the doctrine, and produce results rather than 
reasoning. 
The Court also has two other options that would delay a 
moment of reckoning with the problem of how to assess 
                                                     
 52. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights 
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 781, 782 (2007). 
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classifications that reinforce disadvantage and stigma, but which 
do not fall within the traditional categories of heightened 
scrutiny. First, the Court may elect to ground a marriage 
decision in the Liberty—rather than the Equal Protection—
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In that way, the Court 
could sidestep equality doctrine completely, as it did in its 
invalidation of a state sodomy law.54 Second, the Court may 
prefer to conceptualize sexual orientation discrimination as sex 
discrimination, recognizing that the same gender stereotypes 
that drive discrimination against women also stigmatize anyone 
who does not conform to gender norms, including in their sexual 
practices and choice of partners.55 The questions that I address in 
this Article are those that will remain after such a decision on 
the marriage issue. 
If and when the Court does elect to mark a trail out of its 
self-created predicament, two possible paths suggest themselves. 
The Court could venture down the path utilized by virtually 
every major common law constitutional court in the world except 
the United States: the analysis of discriminatory classifications 
under the principle of proportionality. Alternatively, it could 
return to first principles and recuperate the anti-caste mandate 
that animated the Reconstruction era framers. I shall evaluate 
each possibility in turn as it applies to sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
A. Proportionality 
Other than the United States, all three of the major judicial 
systems that have decided multiple LGBT rights claims—
Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, and South 
Africa—utilize a proportionality approach when adjudicating 
constitutional equality issues.56 The core inquiry underlying a 
proportionality analysis is whether the burdens imposed on a 
politically vulnerable minority are discontinuous with, and 
                                                     
 53. The right to marry is recognized as fundamental under the Due Process Clause. 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). 
 54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
 55. Several lower courts have noted the applicability of a sex discrimination 
framework. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479–85 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., 
concurring); Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13-cv-00410 KGB, 2014 WL 6685391, at *23–24 
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 25, 2014); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2014 WL 
6386903, at *10–11 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 
2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 56. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 531 para. 138 (Can.); Karner v. Austria, 
2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 212; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 
550–55 paras. 63–74 (S. Afr.). 
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disproportional to, whatever neutral public goals are asserted as 
the purpose of the challenged provision. 
Proportionality analysis turns on a multi-step standard. 
Courts ask first “whether a prima facie case has been made to 
the effect that a government act burdens the exercise of a 
right.”57 This is the threshold point at which courts determine 
which classifications trigger equality jurisprudence and thereby 
merit any scrutiny at all. At the next stage, these other systems 
have developed a method for determining when government may 
treat groups of individuals differently by asking a series of three 
questions, known as the limitations analysis: 
1. Whether the burden on the asserted right is rationally 
related to a sufficiently legitimate government objective; 
2. Whether there is a less restrictive means by which the 
government could achieve the same goal without 
burdening the right; and 
3. Whether the burden on the right outweighs the benefits 
to the government of its infringement.58 
The similarities and differences compared to Equal 
Protection analysis in the United States are fairly self-evident. If 
a claimant succeeds at the prima facie stage, the analysis inverts 
what traditionally had been the logical order in American case 
law. In earlier U.S. discrimination cases, courts first asked 
whether a classification met the criteria for heightened scrutiny; 
if so, courts proceeded to the probing questions that comprise the 
second and third queries of the limitations analysis. U.S. courts 
reached a rational basis standard only if it had found that the 
classification did not entail heightened scrutiny. 
Under a proportionality analysis, the initial threshold is 
much lower. When courts assess whether to pursue any equality 
review, there is no initial channeling of classifications into tiers, 
as has developed in U.S. law. Instead, if there are any indicia of 
invidious or systemic discrimination, constitutional courts first 
ask whether there is a rational basis. Even if a rational basis 
exists, the inquiry nonetheless goes on to the second and third 
queries, thus pursuing the elements of stricter scrutiny. 
The proportionality model of analysis precisely describes 
what the Supreme Court has actually done in its three major 
LGBT rights cases. After reviewing the animus or prejudice 
underlying an anti-gay law, the Court—without articulating a 
specific tier of review—has concluded that the law in question 
                                                     
 57. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights 
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 802 (2011). 
 58. Id. at 802–03. 
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effectively lacks a rational basis. At that point, as in a 
disproportionality analysis, the Court has reached its judgment. 
This conceptual overlap between proportionality and the 
LGBT case results has gone unnoticed.59 Only one Justice of the 
Supreme Court has explicitly alluded to disproportionality 
analysis and then not in the context of LGBT rights issues.60 
None of the post-Windsor lower federal courts have utilized this 
method in the flood of marriage law challenges that followed that 
decision. 
The controversy associated with importation of non-U.S. law—
even from our closest jurisprudential kin—suggests why advocates 
might hesitate to press such an approach too strongly.61 The foreign 
law canard is a red herring, however. There is a significant history 
of proportionality concepts in the Court’s constitutional precedents. 
The proportionality principle also explains a number of nonsexual 
orientation cases in which the Court has struck down legislation 
imposing burdens based on nonsuspect classifications and burdens 
on nonfundamental liberties. 
In Plyler v. Doe, for example, the Court struck down a law 
barring undocumented resident children from public schools, 
noting that their immigration status was a legitimate basis for 
classification, yet their exclusion from public schools would 
produce “a lifetime [of] hardship” with the “stigma of illiteracy 
[that] will mark them for the rest of their lives.”62 The Court has 
also struck down laws imposing especially serious burdens on 
low-income persons even though poverty is not a suspect 
classification. “[I]n criminal trials a State can no more 
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, 
race, or color.”63 Although there is no absolute constitutional 
right to initiate litigation or appeal, the Court has struck down 
economic barriers in civil cases implicating important liberty 
interests.64 
                                                     
 59. I described the Romer opinion as grounded in the concept of proportionality but 
did not elaborate on the doctrine as developed outside the United States. Hunter, supra 
note 9, at 908. 
 60. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 61. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 291, 291–95 (2005). See generally The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in 
U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005) (Norman Dorsen, moderator). 
 62. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
 63. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). 
 64. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (termination of parental rights); cf. 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971) (access to judicial proceedings for 
divorce). 
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The overarching principle that greater burdens require more 
persuasive justifications is the conceptual key to the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence in sexual orientation cases. What is 
most striking is not what the Justices have said or not said, but 
what they have done. In each of its three most significant 
decisions, the Court has essentially concluded that laws barring 
normal amendment of civil rights statutes, criminalizing 
intimate sexual conduct, and disqualifying one group of lawful 
marriages from recognition under federal law are grossly 
excessive measures in relation to the purported goals of the 
legislation. This is proportionality analysis if it is anything, and 
one option for the Court to end its doctrinal muddle would be for 
it to name it for what it is. 
B. Caste 
A second conceptual option for the Supreme Court in 
approaching LGBT rights issues is to invoke the anti-caste 
principle animating the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor 
Eskridge’s Article provides a powerful description of this 
principle’s historical importance. Although he does so as part of 
an argument for application of an original meaning 
understanding, I discuss the two ideas separately in this Article 
because the Court could choose to utilize either or both branches 
of the conjoined theory in its same-sex marriage analysis. In 
other words, a caste analysis does not necessarily require 
adoption of original meaning jurisprudence, which I will treat in 
more detail in the next section. 
Similarly to proportionality, one could argue that the Court 
has already begun using caste analysis in LGBT rights cases. 
The origins of the anti-caste argument in this category of cases 
lie in the amicus brief on behalf of constitutional law professors 
filed by Professor Laurence Tribe in Romer v. Evans.65 Tribe’s 
brief eschewed discussion of the tiers of Equal Protection review 
and instead painted equality under law in the broad strokes 
adopted by Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court.66 
                                                     
 65. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
1–3, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008432. 
 66. Compare id. at 3–4 (“To decree that some identifying feature or characteristic of a 
person or group may not be invoked as the basis of any claim of discrimination under any law 
or regulation enacted, previously or in the future, by the state, its agencies, or its localities—
when persons and groups not sharing this characteristic are not similarly handicapped—is, by 
definition, to deny the ‘equal protection of the laws’ to persons having that characteristic.” 
(emphasis in original)), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (“A law declaring that in general it shall 
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is 
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”). 
Do Not Delete   3/14/2015  4:17 PM 
2015] A DEER IN HEADLIGHTS 1137 
The greatest appeal of the caste analogy as an analytic tool 
for courts is that it is simultaneously broad and narrow. Its 
origins in Equal Protection jurisprudence lay in the radical 
egalitarianism (for that time) of the Reconstruction framers and 
their intense antipathy to laws that “entrench social groups as 
inferior castes.”67 Its built-in limiting principle is that caste 
surely signals a systemic structure that is far more damaging 
and malicious than mere discrimination. Minimally, one could 
say that the caste analogy requires at least five independent 
criteria: 
1. A pattern of legal and social adverse treatment that is 
pervasive; 
2. That the pattern is continuous over a long period of time, 
even if diminishing during some periods; 
3. That its enforceability is strengthened by the targeting of 
a single characteristic; 
4. That the cumulative effect suppresses open and robust 
political contestation by those who are disadvantaged; 
and 
5. That no strong public or governmental interest justifies 
its existence.68 
To this formidable list, the original meaning claim 
articulated by Professor Eskridge adds an additional 
requirement: that a caste-like system is one driven by an 
ideology of invidiousness. I agree that such an ideology should 
trigger searching review. The separate-but-equal apartheid of 
southern segregation, for example, was doomed never to produce 
equality, even had southern whites invested resources in ways 
that led to equal test scores or teacher salaries in the black-only 
schools, because the propagation of the ideology of white 
supremacy was embedded at every level of public education. And 
I welcome the explicit addition of ideology to an understanding of 
the anti-caste principle that various scholars have argued 
properly belongs at the center of Equal Protection jurisprudence. 
Securing that understanding, however, like an 
acknowledgment of the role of proportionality, likely will have to 
await a future Court with a different political stripe. In its race 
jurisprudence, the current Court seems to have slammed this 
particular analytic door shut. As Justice Stevens noted in an 
affirmative action case, “There is no moral or constitutional 
                                                     
 67. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1084; see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 
106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2353–54 (1997). 
 68. This distillation is drawn from the cases cited in Eskridge, supra note 14, 
passim. 
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equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a 
caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial 
subordination.”69 Since that time, the racism-blind use of a 
heightened standard of review regardless of whether whites or 
racial minorities claim discriminatory treatment has remained in 
place. It is difficult to imagine that the Court will see the 
anti-gay history that Professor Eskridge has so carefully 
documented as comparable to caste when it apparently cannot 
see the treatment of nonwhite persons as such. 
C. Summary 
The foregoing options represent different jurisprudential 
approaches to interpretation. The adoption of the proportionality 
principle speaks to a mindset of pragmatic governance. It seeks 
balance and fairness rather than modifications to the weight of this 
or that interest or the suspectness of each new classification. The 
anti-caste principle turns to a more directly historical approach, 
focusing on the dynamics of subordination that have affected each 
group. Either could become the basis for a more fully reasoned 
articulation of Equal Protection law. At stake is the future of 
classifications based not only on sexual orientation, but also on 
other grounds that will emerge in the future as similarly contested. 
IV. ORIGINALISM’S LIVING MEANING 
  Justice Scalia: . . . I’m curious . . . when did it become 
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from 
marriage? 1791? 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted? . . . 
  Mr. Olson: . . . [M]ay I answer this in the form of a 
rhetorical question? When did it become unconstitutional to 
prohibit interracial marriages? When did it become 
unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools[?] 
  Justice Scalia: It’s an easy question, I think, for that one. 
At . . . the time that the Equal Protection Clause was 
adopted. That’s absolutely true. But don’t give me a 
question to my question. . . . When do you think it became 
unconstitutional? Has it always been unconstitutional? 
  Mr. Olson: When the . . . California Supreme Court faced 
the decision, which it had never faced before, [of: D]oes 
excluding gay and lesbian citizens, who are a class based 
upon their status as homosexuals . . . . 
                                                     
 69. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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  Justice Scalia: [T]hat’s . . . not when it became 
unconstitutional. . . . When did it become unconstitutional 
to prohibit gays from marrying? 
  Mr. Olson: . . . [T]hey did not assign a date to it, Justice 
Scalia, as you know. . . . 
  Justice Scalia: I’m not talking about the California 
Supreme Court. . . . You say it is now unconstitutional. 
  Mr. Olson: Yes. 
  Justice Scalia: Was it always unconstitutional? 
  Mr. Olson: It was constitutional [sic] when we—as a 
culture determined that sexual orientation is a 
characteristic of individuals that they cannot control . . . . 
  Justice Scalia: I see. When did that happen? When did 
that happen? 
  Mr. Olson: There’s no specific date in time. This is an 
evolutionary cycle. 
  Justice Scalia: Well, how am I supposed to know how to 
decide a case . . . if you can’t give me a date when the 
Constitution changes? 
 . . . . 
  Justice Scalia: 50 years ago, it was okay? 
  Mr. Olson: . . . I can’t answer that question . . . . 
  Justice Scalia: I can’t either. That’s the problem. That’s 
exactly the problem.70 
The Scalia-Olson exchange pointedly framed an enduring 
puzzle embedded in constitutionalism: How can judicial 
interpretation of unamended text legitimately accommodate 
various forms of change, especially changes in the social 
meanings and moral valence of certain behaviors. There is no 
more contentious example of this problem than the unstable 
cultural consensus regarding expressions of gender and sexuality 
that has emerged in the last decade. Reconciling this rocky past 
to the principle of fidelity to original meaning is no easy task. 
The Frankel Lecture contributes to the emergence of what 
one might describe as a truce in one corner of jurisprudential 
politics. Scholars loosely associated with right, left, and center 
have endorsed the idea that the starting point for constitutional 
interpretation should be the original public meaning of 
constitutional text, even if the full reach of this meaning was not 
endorsed or expected by the framers. Professor Steven Calabresi 
                                                     
 70. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–41, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144). 
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has used this interpretive method to argue that several of the 
Court’s decisions in pro-equality cases, including Loving v. 
Virginia,71 can be justified as implementations of original 
meaning,72 and he has recently posted an essay on SSRN in 
which he argues that original meaning also mandates the 
invalidation of exclusionary marriage laws.73 Professor Jack 
Balkin has proffered a theory of “framework originalism” that 
would produce essentially the same results.74 Professor 
Eskridge’s Frankel Lecture Address provides by far the most 
extensive articulation of the link between original meaning and 
the issues raised in the same-sex marriage cases. 
My first hesitation about this original meaning argument is 
tactical and retrospective. Simply put, given the retrenchment of 
the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence in the context of race, 
I am skeptical that judges and others who promote originalist 
interpretative strategies would adopt the method as proffered for 
the same-sex marriage cases.75 Even traditional originalists have 
accepted Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia as 
legitimate exercises of Equal Protection review. Yet, as Justice 
Scalia’s comments in the foregoing colloquy illustrate, those 
views can coexist with a willingness to apply different standards 
for race than for other forms of discrimination and to stress 
literal differentiation over effective subordination in the 
interpretive process. I doubt that the originalist methodology 
associated, for example, with Justice Scalia is likely to produce 
recognition that laws excluding gay and lesbian couples from 
marriage fall into the same category as those invalidated in 
Loving. 
My second concern is conceptual and prospective. An original 
meaning approach potentially narrows the scope of Equal 
Protection. The linguistic lynchpin in the Loving decision that 
supports an analysis based on caste is the Court’s explicit 
                                                     
 71. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 72. Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 
2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1398; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, 
Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education 11–12 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 13-26, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307651; Steven G. Calabresi & Julia 
T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (2011). 
 73. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same 
Sex Marriage (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper 
No. 14-51, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509443.  
 74. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 21–22 (2011). 
 75. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Nobody in this 
case . . . argues that the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment understood it to 
require the States to change the definition of marriage.”). 
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reference to “White Supremacy.”76 Without either that reference 
or the history of southern white extremism, however, the Court 
surely should have reached the same result. 
Consider the example of disability. The Court rejected 
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on disability in City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, but nonetheless 
invalidated a restriction on group homes for mentally disabled 
persons, in one of its first uses of heightened rational basis 
review.77 Few constitutional cases have raised disability 
discrimination issues since Cleburne because of a series of 
subsequent legislative actions by Congress that provided 
protection in federally funded programs, employment, public 
accommodations, transportation, and housing.78 As a result, the 
practical need for anti-discrimination litigation based on the 
Constitution has been all but erased in this field. 
The major constitutional development since Cleburne has 
been to weaken anti-discrimination statutes for having gone too 
far in holding states liable for discrimination. A state 
government entity challenged the Americans with Disabilities 
Act successfully on the ground that Congress lacked sufficient 
proof of a history of widespread and persistent discrimination by 
the states to justify the waiver of state sovereign immunity.79 If 
the record that Congress had established, which was significant, 
could not survive the congruence and proportionality standard, it 
seems quite unlikely that the Court would find it to be a proper 
basis for a finding of caste-like subordination.80 This ruling 
suggests, then, that an original meaning approach would offer 
little support for classifications such as disability that have 
elicited a mix of positive as well as negative regulatory responses 
by the government, were not thought of as a social minority until 
relatively recently, and comprise a huge range of conditions from 
the most stigmatized and vulnerable to the largely invisible. 
For a second example of classifications for which there is 
little recourse for irrational discrimination, one could analyze 
those based on immigration or citizenship status. Congress has 
long been accorded plenary power to regulate immigration, in 
cases that date back to roughly the same post-Reconstruction era 
                                                     
 76. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
 77. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 450 (1985). 
 78. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327; Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355. 
 79. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 370 (2001). 
 80. Id. at 374. 
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in which the Court endorsed Jim Crow laws.81 The text of the 
Equal Protection Clause references “persons,” not “citizens.” Yet 
noncitizens are routinely treated unequally. Unlike Bowers v. 
Hardwick,82 Korematsu has never been reversed.83 
I would argue that resident noncitizens satisfy the indicia of 
caste. A variety of laws envelop them in a system of disfavored 
status, with compounding results. This system of subordination 
also satisfies the requirement of an underlying ideology: that of 
nationalism. Stated alternatively, the law demands that the 
individual profess loyalty to a set of ideas thought to constitute 
Americanism, with no requirement that the absence of such 
loyalty would result in harm to valid interests of the nation.84 
In sum, my primary concern regarding an original meaning 
argument is whether it is too self-limiting to provide relief to 
persons who have suffered from systems of social hierarchy in 
the United States, and who are today’s pariahs. Although 
Professor Eskridge’s proposal is intended as an expansion of 
equality principles, the Court’s adoption of an original meaning 
basis for a ruling that bans on same-sex marriage violate the 
Constitution risks having the ultimate effect of narrowing the 
scope of the Equal Protection Clause. 
V. THE THEORETICAL VACUUM: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY 
If original meaning prohibits castes, and castes require an 
underlying ideology of invidiousness to qualify as such, then in 
making an anti-caste argument against the subordination of 
LGBT persons, one must identify the ideology driving the 
discrimination. Professor Eskridge argues that compulsory 
heterosexuality is that ideology, fueled by stereotypes of “gay” as 
anti-family and of LGBT persons as sex-obsessed predators on 
children. 
The regime of compulsory heterosexuality that emerged as 
various disciplinary structures, including law, began penalizing 
same-sex desire, operated in tandem with profound gender 
normativity. Effeminate men and masculine women became the 
public face of sodomy and the core of gender deviant 
                                                     
 81. See Mark S. Kende, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Korematsu Problem, 30 HARV. J. 
ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 293, 293 & n.3 (2014) (noting efforts to get the U.S. Supreme 
Court to repudiate the decision). 
 82. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
 83. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 84. Nikhil Aziz & Chip Berlet, Nationalism, in DEFENDING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: AN 
ACTIVIST RESOURCE KIT 45, 47 (2002). 
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subcultures.85 To use Professor Eskridge’s terminology and 
periodization, the “anti-gay terror” of 1921 to 1969 began not only 
with the prosecutions of gays, but also with the era of “the new 
woman” who claimed for herself sexual and reproductive 
autonomy.86 Although not perfectly in sync, the evolution of 
gender norms into somewhat less strictly binary codes in the 
latter part of the twentieth and the first part of the twenty-first 
century coincided with the growing toleration of gender deviance 
and lesbian and gay sexual culture. 
The central role of gender normativity carries over into 
the specific realm of marriage law. First recognized during 
Phyllis Schlafly’s campaign against the Equal Rights 
Amendment on the ground that its adoption would lead to 
same-sex marriage,87 the argument that “genderless marriage” 
threatens social stability and particularly the welfare of 
children has fueled the crusade against legalization of gay 
marriage.88 As is often true of social panics, it is impossible to 
distill which of several tropes most reliably produce a level of 
anxiety that can be mobilized for political contests. Indeed, the 
relative force of particular arguments may shift over time. 
Certainly today, however, the discomfort over unconventional 
gender roles is as fundamental to anti-gay campaigns as 
disgust over specific sexual acts.89 
In her concurring opinion in the challenge to same-sex 
marriage bans in Nevada and Idaho, Judge Marsha Berzon 
described the history of legal restrictions on women’s choices in 
the arenas of work, marriage, parenting, and other life activities, 
and tied them to the same stereotyping underlying arguments 
that the law should prohibit “genderless” marriage by same-sex 
couples.90 The gender stereotyping behind bans on same-sex 
marriage, she concluded, “affect[s] men and women in basically 
the same way as, not in a fundamentally different manner from, 
                                                     
 85. JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 226–28, 288–95 (1988). 
 86. Id. at 233–34. 
 87. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1389–93 
(2006). 
 88. See, for example, repeated references to how the defendants in one recent same-
sex marriage case framed their arguments as objections to allowing “genderless marriage” 
because equal marriage laws lack “gender complementarity” and fail to reinforce “[t]he 
man-woman meaning at the core of the marriage institution [that] has always recognized, 
valorized, and made normative the roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ . . . .” Latta v. Otter, 771 
F.3d 456, 486, 490–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 473 (majority opinion). 
 90. Id. at 486–87 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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a wide range of laws and policies that have been viewed 
consistently as discrimination based on sex.”91 
This foundation of gender in the debates over LGBT rights 
broadly and same-sex marriage specifically complicates the 
argument that an anti-gay caste system underlies the laws that 
are currently under challenge. Applying a caste analysis based 
on sexual orientation alone misses the inextricable melding of 
sexuality with gender. Although the two themes overlap and 
reinforce one another in multiple ways, they are distinguishable. 
Professor Eskridge’s Article correctly points to a series of state 
actions directed specifically at homosexual persons, regardless of 
gender.92 The problem is that while the historical narrative may 
support the claim of a caste-like regime based on repressive 
anti-gay actions by the state, it is considerably weaker in 
demonstrating that the regime’s ideology centered so clearly on 
sexuality as distinct from gender. 
My argument is not that gender simply trumps sexual 
orientation in the analytic calculus. It is also true that an 
element related to sexuality has almost always been present in 
the ideology and legal structure of gender subordination. Just as 
one finds gender normativity at the heart of repressive laws 
directed at gay men and lesbians, one finds sexuality and 
specifically sexual restriction at the heart of laws that have 
limited women’s liberty. Looked at through a broader lens than 
homosexuality, sexual regulation has always been gendered. 
Whether one examines laws addressing pregnancy, reproductive 
decision-making, sexual violence, workplace norms, or military 
service, “burdens on women’s sexual expression . . . enforce[] 
traditional gender roles by binding women to the reproductive 
consequences of heterosexual activity”93 and by enforcing gender 
normativity within families. 
The two discourses of sexuality and gender are most merged 
in the realm of ideology, one comparable to the white supremacy 
identified by the Court as underlying the anti-miscegenation 
laws struck down in Loving v. Virginia. Gender performance and 
sexual dissent constitute the expressive dimension of the equal 
liberty claims at issue both in LGBT rights litigation and in 
women’s rights cases.94 The struggle on the ground for the 
                                                     
 91. Id. 
 92. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1094–98.  
 93. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1238 (2007). 
 94. I develop this argument more fully in Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: 
Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2000). 
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freedom to breathe life into new gender and sexual norms is very 
much a battle of ideas. The power of the closet is and has always 
been its capacity to police discursive space. 
The best mechanism for incorporating an original meaning 
jurisprudence into this line of cases would take us back even 
further than the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Fundamentally, nonnormative forms of sexuality and gender 
constitute performances of dissent. Thus, the correct answer to 
Justice Scalia’s question to Ted Olson about when bans on gay 
marriage became unconstitutional is 1791. That is the year when 
the framers adopted the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
protection against state-enforced orthodoxy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is at a crossroads in its Equal Protection 
jurisprudence. Cases involving LGBT rights issues have 
identified the need for the Court to craft a new generation of 
Equal Protection law, if only to serve its traditional function of 
providing meaningful guidance in future cases. Deficiencies in 
current law go beyond mere lack of clarity, however. How the 
Court addresses the current doctrinal and theoretical 
shortcomings in this corner of constitutional law will help shape 
new social meanings of equality. 
 
